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DEPORTATION AND EXCLUSION: A CONTINUING
DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS
INTRODUCTION: THE NEW LAW
ON September 26, 1961, the President signed an immigration bill' con-
taining a section prescribing for the first time a statutory scheme for judicial
review of deportation and exclusion orders.2 The explicit goal of the section,
which originated as a separate House bill,3 was to prevent the use of judicial
review to delay execution of such orders.4 A study of the ancestry of that bill,
1. S. 2237, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 75 Stat. 650 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101,
1105a, 1152, 1153, 1155, 1182, 1201, 1202, 1251, 1255a, 1421, 1440, 1451, 1481, 1486 (Supp.
1961). See also S. REP. No. 646, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1086,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; CONF. REP. No. 1172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
2. S. 2237 was originally designed to extend the alien orphan program. See S. REP.
No. 646, supra note 1. The enacted version included several additional provisions, one
of which, § 5, 75 Stat. 651-53 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § l105a (Supp. 1961), prescribed pro-
cedures for judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders.
3. The review provisions originated in H.R. 187, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). H.R.
187 was reported, see H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and passed the
House of Representatives, 107 CONG. REc. 11338 (daily ed. July 10, 1961), but died in the
Senate Judiciary Committee. References in the text to the act establishing the review
provisions will hereinafter be to H.R. 187.
The review provisions aroused great controversy, as shown by the House debate on
H.R. 187, see 107 CONG. REC. 11330-38 (daily ed. July 10, 1961), and the Senate de-
bate on the Conference Report, see 107 CONG. REc. 18462-70 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1961).
See also Hearings on H.R. 13311 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 10, 1958). A more dramatic account is given
by an exchange among Representative Francis Walter, author of the bill; the Justice
Department; and the editors of the New Republic. See "Mr. Walter's Squeeze Play,"
New Republic, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 5; "An Unfair Judgment," Letter to the Editor from
Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, with Editorial Reply, New Republic,
Oct. 9, 1961, p. 31; "Did the New Republic Misrepresent Francis Walter's Bill?" Letter
to the Editor from Francis Walter, with Editorial Reply, New Republic, Oct. 30, 1961,
p. 2 0 .
In addition to H.R. 187 in this session, two earlier bills which were virtually identical
were also passed by the House, and died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. See note
16 infra. But because the House attached the provisions to a bill already passed by the
Senate, and insisted on the amendments in the Conference Committee-whose report
cannot be amended-the Senate Judiciary Committee was bypassed and the Senate was
forced to accept or reject everything. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1961, p. 30, col. 1. Un-
doubtedly many of those opposed to the provisions of H.R. 187 were induced to vote for
the Conference Report because of their desire to achieve passage of the alien orphan pro-
gram and other humanitarian provisions added to the original bill. See remarks of Senator
Pastore, 107 CoNG. RFc. 18467 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1961). Senator Javits called the pro-
cedure "shotgun legislation." Ibid.
4. This feeling is reflected on virtually every page of H.R. RE,. No. 565, mipra note
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H.R. 187, indicates that it also represents the most recent episode in a long
standing controversy between the courts and Congress in the area of im-
migration procedures and practices.5
Previous legislation, by making administrative orders of deportation and
exclusion final,6 reflected a consistent congressional desire to limit judicial
participation in immigration matters.7 But the courts could not be excluded
completely from the area, because the practical impossibility of executing
the order 8 without taking the alien into custody 9 made the judicial writ
of habeas corpus available 10 to provide at least a modicum of judicial scru-
3. See especially the chronologies of specific cases, id. at 20-26, and the chronology of
the still pending case of Carlos Marcello, id. at 7-11.
See also the Committee's conclusion, id. at 19, quoting the earlier remarks of Chair-
man Walter, at the Hearings on H.R. 13311, supra note 3.
5. See text at notes 104-09 infra.
The general institutional conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court in the last
few years also formed a significant part of the background of H.R. 187. Thus there was a
feeling that the courts themselves were cooperating in allowing certain classes of aliens
to abuse the judicial process. See 107 CONG. REc. 11331 (daily ed. July 10, 1961) (explana-
tion of Chairman Walter). See also Hearings on H.R. 13311, supra note 3, at 6. It should
also be noted that the res judicata provisions added to diminish repeated review, see text
at notes 17-26 infra, in contrast to other statutes with similar purpose, make the applica-
tion of res judicata mandatory, allowing no judicial discretion. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§
2244, 2255 (1958).
Congress has long been concerned with what it regards as judicial intrusion in im-
migration matters. See note 112 infra. In the past few years, however, this feeling has
been extended over broader areas. See PnrrcH=rv, CoNGREss VERSUS THE SUPREME
CouRT, 1957-1960 (1961). 'Especially illustrative are the accounts of several attempted
Congressional reversals of the Supreme Court which attracted significant support, but
were not passed.
6. See 3 DAvis, ADMINIsTRATmv LAw TREATisE § 23.08, at 324 n.2 (1958).
7. See text at notes 112-23 infra.
8. Technically, exchsion refers to the refusal to admit a non-resident alien; expul-
sion refers to the required departure of a resident alien; and deportation refers to any
process by which an alien physically within this country or detained at a border is re-
moved. Since aliens can be physically present without having made an entry in contempla-
lion of law, deportation can be the removal of either an excluded or expelled alien.
However, since the legislation discussed here uses non-technical terminology, this Com-
ment will follow the usage employed by Congress: "exclusion" is the process of excluding
and deporting a non-resident alien; "deportation" is the process of expelling and deport-
ing a resident alien.
9. The process in both deportation and exclusion contains two steps: issuing and
executing the order. The latter step involves custody to the extent that the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service must restrain the alien long enough to remove him.
This restraint may range from the simple act of placing the alien on a ship, to prolonged
detention when-generally because of difficulty in finding a country which will accept the
alien-he virtually cannot be removed. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that
an alien may be detained for a limited period pending removal in deportation. 66 Stat.
210 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1958). The statute places no limitations on detention
pending the removal of an excluded alien. 66 Stat. 201 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1958).
10. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888) ; Chinese Exclusion Case
(Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ; Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651 (1892).
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tiny. 1 The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 12 and the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 13 raised new questions concerning
the availability of direct judicial review. Construing these statutes, the
Supreme Court in 1955 14 and 1956 15 held that judicial review was generally
available in both deportation and exclusion cases. This expansion of judicial
participation in immigration provided the stimulus for the present congressional
attempt to regulate the availability of judicial review. 6
In reacting to the developments underlying its passage, H.R. 187 is
ambivalent. The new law, by reestablishing habeas corpus as the only method of
testing an exclusion order, rejects direct judicial review of such orders.' 7
And while the law expressly accepts direct review of deportation orders, it
simultaneously limits its availability.' 8 Thus, an alien ordered deported may
11. The scope of inquiry under the writ was severely limited at first. See Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review I: The Role of Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REv. 401,
423 (1958). Gradually, however, the writ came to be used as a limited form of re-
view, testing whether the statute had been correctly construed, whether there was
any evidence to support the order, and whether the hearing was fair. See COMIT-
TEE OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO STUDY IMMIGRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
REPORT ON THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 42-46, 122 (mimeo, 1940)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON THE INS]; Gordon, Judicial Review of Exclusion and
Deportation, 31 INTERPRETER RELEASES 74, 76-78 (1954). See also VAN VLECK, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS 194-204 (1932).
12. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as APA].
13. 66 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1958) [hereinafter cited as INA].
14. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (deportation).
15. Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) (exclusion).
16. In 1954 the Attorney General proposed legislation similar to H.R. 187. See Brief
for Petitioner, pp. 56-60, Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955). After the Pedreiro
decision, two such bills were introduced. H.R. 9182, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; S. 3169,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). Other bills on the subject were introduced, finally coalescing
in a bill whose provisions were virtually identical to those of H.R. 187, H.R. 13311, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Hearings were held, Hearings on H.R. 13311 Before Subconmit-
tee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 10, 1958) ;
the bill was reported favorably, H.R. REP. No. 2478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), and
was passed by the House, 104 CONG. REc. 17179 (1958). It died in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. In 1959, the same bill went through the same process, although no hearings
were held. H.R. 2087, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; H.R. REP. No 423, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959) ; passed House, 105 CONG. REc. 12729 (1959). No action of any sort was
taken in 1960, perhaps because of the election campaign, and the bill was finally passed in
the closing days of the 1961 session.
17. Section l(b), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 652 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § ll05a(b) (Supp.
1961). In rejecting the effect of the decision in Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180
(1956), the Committee expressed its attitude in these words:
The sovereign United States cannot give recognition to a fallacious doctrine that
an alien has a "right" to enter this country which he may litigate in the courts of
the United States against the U.S. Government as a defendant.
H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 19.
18. Section l(a), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § ll05a(a) (Supp.
1961). This section brings the review of deportation orders under the Hobbs Act, 64 Stat.
[Vol. 71 :760
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bring a "petition for review" of the order,' 9 but he must do so within six
months. 20 The action may not be brought in a district court, but only in the
1129 (1950), 5 U.S.C. 1031-42 (1958), with the exception of nine listed provisions. The
Hobbs Act procedures applies to the following agencies as well: Federal Communications
Cummission; Department of Agriculture; United States Maritime Commission; Federal
Maritime Board; Maritime Administration; and Atomic Energy Commission. Critics
have charged that the procedure of the Hobbs Act is designed for parties with great re-
sources seeking to review complex economic determinations, and is too cumbersome to
afford fair opportunity to individual aliens, many of whom are poor and unfamiliar with
our laws or our language. Hearings on H.R. 13311, supra note 3, at 50-51 (testimony of
Harry Rosenfield). This criticism, centering chiefly on the increased cost and inconveni-
ence of having to apply for review in a circuit court-of which they are 11-rather than
a district court--of which there are nearly 100-and on the short statute of limitations,
argues that the act will not affect the aliens who have heretofore been able to pro-
long the judicial process, but will affect chiefly aliens with limited resources. Hearings
on H.R. 13311, supra note 3, at 13-15 (testimony of Representative Celler). Proponents
of the bill, on the other hand, argue that the general pattern of the Hobbs Act is employed
in the review of all administrative action, and is modified here to take account of the
differences in immigration cases: the statute of limitations is lengthened from sixty days
to six months; records and briefs may be typewritten rather than printed; a substantial
claim of citizenship is tried de novo in a district court; and aliens in custody may still
petition for writs of habeas corpus. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 14-16.
Indeed, the bill apparently reflects the assumption that an alien who seeks judicial
review at all, is willing to abuse the process: "Most of the aliens who are contesting
deportation have nothing but frivolous claims." Hearing on H.R. 13311, supra note 3,
at 22 (Representative Walter). See id. 5, 6. The fact that the aliens generally lose in
court is cited as support. 104 CONG. Rzc. 17173-74 (1958). The Report also concludes that
most of the aliens whose review is protracted are "subversives, gangsters, immoral, or
narcotic peddlers." H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 2. This view is further reflected in
the attitude toward the statute of limitations:
From the point of view of the interests of the United States, it has been concluded
that such a period before the alien commences his judicial review action is ample
from the standpoint of the possible subversive, criminal, or immoral activities in
which the alien might engage, untrammeled by any law, while he ponders the
propriety of the deportation order against him.
H.R. REP. No. 2478, supra note 16, at 8.
19. Section 1(a) (1), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § l05a(a)(1)
(Supp. 1961). The use of the term "petition for review" seems to be an attempt to avoid
repetitious suits and to create uniformity. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 5-6. Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, any applicable writ could be used, in the absence of
a special statutory proceeding. APA § 10(b), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(b)
(1958). The most common writs sought under the APA were injunctions, e.g., Shaugh-
nessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955), and declaratory judgments, e.g., Brownell v. Tom
We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956). The petition for review is a special statutory proceed-
ing; therefore it renders inapplicable the provision allowing any proper writ. In this
sense, while H.R. 187 limits review granted under the APA, it is within the provisions of
the APA and "implements" those provisions. See Hearings on H.R. 13311, supra note
3, at 46, 51-52.
20. Section l(a)(1), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § ll05a(a)(1)
(Supp. 1961). H.R. 187 allows six months from the date of the final deportation order in
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court of appeals of the circuit where the alien resides or the circuit where the
order originated.21 The right to habeas corpus is explicitly retained 22 and
is exempt from the jurisdictional provisions limiting the statutory petition.
2 3
H.R. 187, by applying the principle of res judicata both to petitions for
review and to writs of habeas corpus,2 4 also seeks to end the practice of filing
more than one suit to review a single order.25 A petition for either type of
review must indicate whether the order has been upheld in any prior judicial
proceeding; if it has, no new suit can be entertained "unless the petition
presents grounds which the court finds could not have been presented in
such prior proceedings, or the court finds that the remedy provided by such
prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the
order."26
which to bring a petition for review. The determination of when an order becomes final
has always been important because of the need to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review, a requirement retained in section (c) of the bill, 75 Stat. 653
(1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(c) (Supp. 1961). The determination of finality is made
vital by the combination of the statute of limitations and the requirement of exhausting
administrative finality. During the House debate on H.R. 2807, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), the author, Representative Walter, and the committee reporter, Representative
Moore, agreed to a statement by Representative Lindsay that "if there is any remedy on
the administrative level left of any nature, that the deportation order will not be considered
final." 105 CONG. REc. 12728 (1959). It was also stated that "final" meant after a determina-
tion of suspension of deportation. Ibid. Some critics have expressed the fear that the statute of
limitations might run out while the alien was still seeking discretionary relief, such as
gubernatorial pardons, suspension of deportation because of anticipated physical persecu-
tion, or a private bill. Statement by Edith Lowenstein, Hearings on H.R. 13311, vipra
note 3, at 62-64. See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, ImmIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURZ 696-802
(1959). The pressure of a statute of limitations, furthermore, may produce more suits
for judicial review than have been brought until now, by aliens who would formerly have
relied exclusively on non-judicial remedies. This is especially true of aliens who are
assisted by the voluntary agencies. Statement by Edith Lowenstein, supra. Testimony of
Harry Rosenfield, Hearings on H.R. 13311, supra note 3, at 48-49.
21. Section 1(a)(2), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(a)(2)
(Supp. 1961). The pointed omission of the District of Columbia Circuit as a court in
which the petition may be brought represents an exception to the Hobbs Act, which also
permits review in the District of Columbia Circuit. 64 Stat. 1130 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1033
(1958). The purpose of the exception, according to proponents of the act, is to reduce
crowding in that circuit. "Did the New Republic Misrepresent Francis Walter's Bill?"
supra note 3, at 20. Critics charge that it is an attempt to deprive aliens of the services
of the best immigration lawyers, who are located in Washington. Id. at 22.
22. Section 1(a)(9), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 652 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(a)(9)
(Supp. 1961).
23. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 15. See also "Did the New Republic Misrepre-
sent Francis Walter's Bill?," supra note 3, at 20.
24. Section 1(c), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 653 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(c) (Supp.
1961).
25. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 14.




Constitutional problems may arise if the res judicata provision of the statute
is employed to limit the availability of habeas corpus.27  Since the issuance
of a deportation order is not generally followed by immediate detention,2 8
the petition for review, in order to come within the six month statute of
limitations, may have to be brought before the alien is taken into custody.
Therefore, a detained alien whose deportation order has previously been
affirmed on a petition for review may be barred by the res judicata provision
from obtaining a writ of habeas corpus. To approve res judicata limitations
on habeas corpus, however, would be to ignore the extraordinary nature of that
writ.20 Res judicata, as a device for ending litigation, is "purely a rule of judi-
cial administration to be applied, like all other such rules, as considerations of
justice... require." 30 Habeas corpus, on the other hand, is a post-detention rem-
edy 3' grounded in the theory that the fact of detention creates a constitutional
right to test all issues bearing on the validity of that detention, even by relitigat-
ing issueg which would otherwise have been foreclosed. 32 Habeas corpus is
therefore itself an implicit rejection of res judicata. 38 In order to avoid the
27. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, clause 2.
The Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York apparently considers the res judicata provision unconstitutional. See 107 CONG.
REc. 11334 (daily ed. July 10, 1961).
28. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMifIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE 521 (1959).
29. The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law,
the great object of which is, the liberation of those who may be imprisoned with-
out sufficient cause.
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
30. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 202 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
31. The petitioner must be in custody. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885). While
it is generally said that bail and parole are not custody within the meaning of habeas
corpus, see Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960) (four Justices dissenting), since the relator
cannot be delivered up by the "custodian," some cases hold that they constitute sufficient
restraint on liberty to justify use of the writ. See It re Peterson, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d
24 (1958), appeal dismissed, 360 U.S. 314 (1959) ; Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 611, 15 So.
2d 293 (1943). These cases have not been followed in any immigration cases. This view
does not weaken the concept of the writ as a weapon with which to achieve freedom.
32. In this sense, it is said that res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus. Waley
v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) ; Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924). See also Sunal
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 189 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
33. The fact that federal judges are today allowed to consider previous denials of
the writ in determining new applications, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958), does not weaken the
proposition that the constitutional requirement of habeas corpus forbids the question of
the legality of detention to be foreclosed by any judicial determination occurring before
detention.
The recently created motion to vacate a judgment in a federal criminal conviction, 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), may represent a partial application of res judicata to habeas corpus,
since a denial of the motion, which must be brought in the sentencing court, can cause
dismissal of a subsequent writ of habeas corpus. However, this controversial procedure,
see Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950), is designed to provide an adequate substitute for the
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constitutional difficulties raised by foreclosing habeas corpus by a pre-deten-
tion remedy,3 4 the courts will probably give a forced construction to the res
judicata provisions of the new law.8 5
writ, one which will lessen the inconvenience of a habeas corpus suit without impinging
on the applicant's rights, and the validity of § 2255 may well depend on its essential
similarity to habeas corpus. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-19 (1952).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the section. See id. at 223;
United States ex rel. Norris v. Swope, 72 Sup. Ct. 1020 (1952) (Douglas, J.). But a
recent case, Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959) (opinion of Stewart, J.,
commanding a majority of the Court, though labeled "concurring"), may strengthen the
view that if § 2255 is to be permitted to foreclose resort to the habeas corpus, it must be
clearly a detention remedy. The Court majority denied the availability of § 2255 where
a prisoner was attacking a sentence he was to serve after finishing the one he was then
serving. The custody requirement may have been emphasized to avoid the question of the
constitutionality of allowing § 2255 to preclude the writ if § 2255 could be used before
detention.
34. The difficulty is even more pronounced because deportation orders adjudicate
only the alien's eventual departure, without referring to any detention which may be
necessary. Detention is not part of the deportation order in the way that criminal de-
tention is part of the criminal conviction, but is dictated by the practical difficulty of
achieving immediate removal. Furthermore, while rigid standards are not applied to de-
portation because it is held to be a civil proceeding, only a thin line separates the de-
tention which is in reasonable pursuance of the deportation order from detention con-
sidered unreasonable, and hence criminal. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896). See note 112 infra. Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 224-28 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The distinction between the order and the
detention is illustrated by the provisions of H.R. 187, which describe the procedure for
reviewing deportation orders issued under § 242(b), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b) (1958). The detention section, however, is § 242(c), 66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1958). Furthermore, if pre-detention review can preclude use of
habeas corpus in immigration cases, there would be even more justification for precluding
a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a prior appeal of a criminal conviction, where
the applicant has had a judicial trial accompanied by constitutional protections due a
criminal defendant. On this theory, then, habeas corpus could be entirely abolished, a
reseult which would make the question of suspension academic.
35. Such a construction, often explicitly or implicitly used by the Supreme Court,
could have several different bases. One possibility would be an expansion of the concept
of custody; see note 31 supra. The most likely approach is through the savings clause;
see text at note 26 supra. The courts may consistently find that judicial proceedings on a
petition for review are inadequate or ineffective remedies. This position may be taken in
conjunction with the broad language of § 1(a) (9) : "Any alien held in custody pursuant
to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceed-
ings." 75 Stat. 652 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105 (a) (9) (Supp. 1961). This judicial technique is
somewhat different, if only because less subtle, from the technique used in the dialogue
discussed in text at notes 104-09 infra.
But at least one court has foreclosed habeas corpus on the basis of declaratory judg-
ment. Rystad v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 912 (1958).
If res judicata effect is given a denial of the petition for review, an alien ordered deported
could still bring habeas corpus to test whether his detention is reasonably in pursuance
of the deportation order. But he might not be able to question the validity of the order
itself. On the other hand, an alien in detention pursuant to an exclusion order could test




H.R. 187 marks the most recent phase in a history of attempts to achieve
equilibrium through "responsive readings" of the developing law in an area
where the legislative and constitutional domains, and hence the responsibilities
of Congress and the courts, are blurred. The outlines of this development
were sharpened with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 3'] which provided fundamental standards of fairness for the administra-
tive process, including procedures for hearings both in rule-making and
adjudication. 7 The act was intended to have general application both to
existing and future legislation, but it was not meant to supersede those
statutes which provided adequate standards or whose policy needs were
inconsistent with the imposition of set standards. 38 The provisions of the act
were severable, in the sense that the applicability of any part of the act to a
given agency action rested on independent considerations. 39 Thus, standards for
conducting hearings were imposed only where hearings were required by stat-
ute.40 The act also sought to protect these standards by a general grant of
judicial review of agency action; but the applicability of this section was also
limited by excepting situations where other statutes precluded review.41
3, at 18-19. Applying a broader scope of review to writs brought by non-residents than
by residents is, in view of past history, surely paradoxical. See notes 115-27 infra.
36. The history of the Administrative Procedure Act can be traced back at least to
1929, when Senator Norris proposed the creation of a separate administrative court.
S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929). The progress in the following years, highlighted
by the studies and report of a Justice Department Committee, ATT'Y GEN. CoMm. ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE REP., Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No.
8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), is described in H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946). See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-41 (1950).
37. Section 4, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958) concerns rule-making.
Section 5, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958) concerns adjudications. Further
provisions for hearings and decisions in rule-making and adjudication are contained in §§
7 & 8, 60 Stat. 241, 242, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1006, 1007 (1958).
38. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong. 230, 311, 325, 369 (1946) ; ATTORNEY GENERA!'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIs-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 97-100, 139 (1947).
39. Many of the individual parts also had dual natures, allowing the APA to be more
widely applicable by being generally adaptable to particular needs. Once it had been
decided whether a certain part generally covered certain action, it had to be decided
whether that action might be considered by the APA to represent a policy adequate and
specific enough to supersede the general provisions of the APA.
40. Sections 7 and 8, 60 Stat. 241, 242, 5 U.S.C. § 1006, 1007 (1958). According to
§ 7(a), nothing in the APA was to supersede specified classes of proceedings provided by
statute. See note 39 supra.
41. Except so far as (1) statutes preclude review or (2) agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion ... any person suffering legal wrong because of any
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the mean-
ing of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
Section 10, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). Section 10(b) provided that the form
of review should be any special statutory review proceeding appropriate to the subject
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The Immigration and Naturalization Service, like other agencies,4 con-
sidered its activities exempt from most of the new requirements.43 It took the
position that the hearing requirements of the APA did not apply because
hearings in immigration proceedings were required not by statute, but merely
by judicial interpretations of statutes,44 and that the review provisions did
not apply because a prior statute, the Immigration Act of 1917, 45 by provid-
ing that administrative determinations would be final, 46 precluded review for
purposes of the APA.4 7 In Eisler v. Clark,48 however, the District Court for
the District of Columbia held the hearing requirements of the APA applic-
able to deportation proceedings, thus rejecting the Service's distinction be-
tween the words of a statute and judicial interpretation of these words.4 9
And in United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi r 0 -again dealing with de-
portation-the Third Circuit held the judicial review provisions of the APA
applicable on the theory that the availability of habeas corpus under the
existing statute dealing with deportation and exclusion orders contradicted
the Service's position that the immigration statute in fact precluded review.
matter; but if such a special proceeding were lacking, any applicable form of action would
be acceptable.
42. See, e.g., Brief for the ICC, pp. 7-40, Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907
(1951). Many agencies had originally wanted to be exempted from the provisions oi the
APA, but specific exemptions were not granted. S. RP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Pt. 2, at 7 (1952) (minority report).
43. Carusi, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 4 MONTHLY & v. 95 (1947). It was also suggested that immigra-
tion regulation was analogous to the conduct of foreign affairs functions, which is specifical-
ly exempt from the Act's rule-making and adjudication requirements. H.R. REP. No.
2140, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948). See also Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.
Va. 1949).
44. Carusi, supra note 43, at 103-04.
45. 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
46. In every case where an alien is ordered excluded from admission into the United
States under any law or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the decision of
a board of special inquiry adverse to the admission of such alien shall be final,
unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney General.
Section 17, 39 Stat. 888 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 1238 (1940).
In every case where any person is ordered deported from the United States under
the provisions of this Act, or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the At-
torney General shall be final.
Section 19, 39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 1238 (1940).
47. Brief for Respondent, pp. 18-36, Martinez v. Neely, 344 U.S. 916 (1953).
48. 77 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1948), cert. denied sub nora. Potash v. Clark, 338 U.S.
879 (1949).
49. .. . the Courts have read due process into the Act, and due process means a
hearing, and ... therefore hearing is an integral part of the Deportation Act; in
fact, just as much as if the Act itself in words stated that a hearing should be held.
Id. at 611.
50. 166 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), dismissed as abated, 168 F2d 1014 (1948).
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Several attempts were made'in Congress to-secure legislation reversing the
effects of these decisions,5 ' but all proved unsuccessful5 2
In 1950 the Supreme Court decided Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
5 3
holding that a deportation hearing at which the presiding inspector functioned
both as "prosecutor" and as "judge," violated the APA. This case marked
the first extended examination of the APA by the Supreme Court,54 and
established that statute as a remedial one, to be construed broadly on the
ground that it represented a "formula upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest."55 Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Jackson held that the limitation of the act to hearings required by existing
statutes was not intended by Congress to exclude hearings read into statutes
by courts on the basis of constitutional necessity, and that Congress intended
the full panoply of the APA standards to apply where--as in deportation
proceedings-hearings were constitutionally required.56 He then went on to
51. The Eisler case was rejected by two circuits before the Supreme Court decided
the question in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). Wong Yang Sung v.
Clark, 174 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Azzolini v. Watkins, 172 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949).
Trinler, on the other hand, was followed in several other cases. See note 75 infra.
52. In 1948, shortly after the decisions in Trinler and Eisler, S. 2755 and H.R. 6652,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), were proposed. H.R. 6652, as reported in H.R. REP. No.
2140, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), specifically exempted the INS from §§ 5, 7, 8 and 10
of the APA-both the hearing and judicial review provisions. The Senate Committee,
however, in S. REP. No. 1588, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), opposed specific exemptions
from the APA and sought to achieve the same effect, in regard to the hearing provisions,
by amending § 19 of the 1917 Act to bring that act within § 7(a) of the APA, excepting
from its hearing requirements hearings conducted according to special statutory provisions.
See note 39 supra. Thus the Senate bill would have achieved the same effect as an express
exemption while remaining "in conformity with the pattern of the APA." The substance
of the House bill was repeated in § 2 of H.R. 10, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), see H.R.
REP. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), this time exempting the INS from §§ 5, 7, 8,
and 10, APA, from the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958), and
from § 503, Nationality Act, 54 Stat. 1171-72 (1940) (declaratory judgment for claim of
citizenship).
53. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
54. The Supreme Court considered the APA, in cursory fashion, in two cases prior to
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath. In United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 672 (1949),
it was noted that judicial review under the APA could be on the record compiled before an
agency. In United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950), the Court re-
jected a claim that the notice provisions of that act had been violated, adding the dictum
that: "It [the APA] created safeguards even narrower than the constitutional ones, against
arbitrary official encroachment on private rights.' The language about the status of the
APA, however, was not related to the holding and was not based on extended consideration
of the Act. Nor is its probative value increased by the fact that the author of U.S. v. Morton
later wrote the Wong Yang Sung opinion. Cf. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S.
611, 639-40 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ; McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176-78
(1950) (Jackson, J., concurring).
55. 339 U.S. at 40.
56. In the original versions of the APA, the word "law" was used instead of "statute."
The Commissioner of Immigration called the term ambiguous, and suggested that it be
replaced by "law or the Constitution." Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 before a
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indicate that a lower standard might not be saved from constitutional invalid-
ity, even if supported by an explicit statement of congressional intent:
Indeed, so to construe the Immigration Act might again bring it into
constitutional jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a hearing, it
requires a fair one, one before a tribunal which ineets at least currently
prevailing standards of impartiality. A deportation hearing involves issues
basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheaval in
lands to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself. It might
be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional standards of
impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of
which has been condemned by Congress as unfair even where less vital
matters of property rights are at stake.
57
Thus, according to the rationale underlying Wong Yang Sung, the constitu-
tional requirement of a hearing is not a matter solely of fixed limits on
governmental power, but involves as well procedural requirements which
expand as the "currently prevailing standards of impartiality" expand.
5 8
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 577 (1941).
Eventually the term "statute" was used. The Service argued that this indicated an intent
to exclude constitutionally required hearings. Brief for Respondent, pp. 17-37, Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). Wong Yang Sung argued that the usage was in-
tended to exclude only those hearings granted as a matter of grace. Brief for Petitioner,
p. 22, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra. See also Brief for Riss & Co., Amicus
Curiae, pp. 8-16, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra.
The Court refused to evaluate the "conflicting" legislative history, but went on to dis-
cuss Congress' intention in the light of the integral connection between the statute and the
constitutional requirement of hearings. By refusing to attribute to Congress the intention of
being less scrupulous about constitutionally required hearings than about hearings required
by statute, the opinion admitted the possibility that Congress might, in a spirit of perversity,
have done so. This technique differed slightly from that used in Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp.
610 (D.D.C. 1948) cert. denied sub nom. Potash v. Clark, 338 U.S. 879 (1949), which
treated the word "statute" as necessarily covering constitutional requirements. Cf. Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
The applicability of the APA's hearing requirements was an important issue before
other agencies as well, especially the Interstate Commerce Commission. In this connection,
Riss & Co., a trucking firm, filed a brief in Wong Yang Sung. The following year, this
effort was rewarded with a per curiam memorandum opinion holding the APA applicable
to the ICC. Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951). The opinion consisted
solely of a citation of Wong Yang Sung.
57. 339 U.S. at 50-51. (Emphasis added.)
58. The Service also contended that § 7(a) of the APA exempted hearings under the
1917 Immigration Act. The section reads in part:
nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes
of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially
provided for by or designated pursuant to statute.
60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (1958). The Service contended that if hearings
were held to be provided by statute, then by the same token they were specially provided
for by § 16 of the 1917 Act, prescribing the duties of immigrant inspectors, 39 Stat.
874, 885 (1917). Brief for Respondents, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950). See notes 39-40 supra. The Court held that the provisions relating to immigrant
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Congress responded to the Wong Yang Sung decision in the same session
with a rider to an appropriations bill,i 9 specifically exempting the INS from
the hearing requirements of the APA.60 This exemption was repealed by the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,61 which provided a statutory basis
for deportation and exclusion hearings, patterned on the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, but omitting the separation of functions re-
quirements applied in Wong Yang Sung.6 2 In Marcello v. Bonds,63 the
inspectors did not designate them as hearing officers, but simply authorized them to
conduct investigations which might or might not be the hearings conducted to satisfy
the Constitution. 339 U.S. at 52.
The difficulty of treading a thin line between exemption from § 7 and inclusion within
§ 7(a) may indicate why the Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath did not follow the
exact reasoning set forth in Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1948). Mr. Justice
Reed dissented, on the ground that § 7(a) was applicable, after declaring that "in this
case no one questions the constitutionality of the hearing Wong received . . " 339 U.S.
at 53 (Reed, J., dissenting).
59. Proceedings under law relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall here-
after be without regard to the provisions of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048 (1950).
The chapter originated as a section of the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill,
H.R. 9526, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1950). See Hearings Before Subcommittees of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 368-77 (1950) ; id., November
30, 322-55. The Committee Report, supra, cited economy as the reason for the provision.
But cf. Note, 71 HARV. L. Rxv. 1324, 1335 n.93 (1958). Representative Walter attempted
unsuccessfully to amend the bill, which came to the floor under a "gag rule," see 96
CoNG. REe. 13546 (1950), by striking the INS exemption, criticizing the section as de-
signed to allow the INS to continue their "arbitrary and capricious practices." Id. at
13546-47.
Note that the act, in contrast to the proposed bills of 1948 and 1949, see note 52 supra,
did not affect the result in Trinler.
60. Proceedings relating to the deportation and exclusion of aliens shall be held with-
out regard to sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
64 Stat. 1052 (1950).
The rider was never tested in the Supreme Court, but it was upheld as constitutional
in Belizaro v. Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Sigurdson v. Landon, 215 F.2d
791 (9th Cir. 1954).
61. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 represented a revision and codifica-
tion of all immigration, nationality, and naturalization laws, with significant changes in
existing statutes. The background and legislative history are discussed in Besterman,
Commentary on the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. pp. 2-4 (1953).
62. A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine
the deportability of any alien, and shall . . . present and receive evidence, inter-
rogate, examine and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the
Attorney General, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation ....
In any case or class of cases in which the Attorney General believes that such
procedure would be of aid in making a determination, he may require specifically
or by regulation that an additional immigration officer shall'be assigned to present
evidence on behalf of the United States. . . . No special inquiry officer shall con-
duct a proceeding in any case under this section in which he shall-have participated
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Supreme Court upheld the new provisions as sufficiently explicit to supersede
the APA requirements 4 and-without mentioning Wong Yang Sung-
sustained them against constitutional attack.65 While this decision seems to
cast doubt on the! rationale of Wong Yang Sung, the proposition concerning
the evolutionary nature of constitutional standards of fairness went beyond
in investigative functions or in which he shall have participated (except as provided
in this subsection) in prosecuting functions ....
Section 242(b), 66 Stat. 209 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958).
These provisions mirrored S. 2755, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), by superseding the
APA under § 7(a), APA rather than granting a blanket exemption. See note 52 supra.
In this way the legislators maintained that a bill whose provisions differed from those of
the APA was "within the framework of" the APA. See 98 CoxG. REc. 5329 (1952) (Re-
marks of Senator McCarran). Compare the following language:
the law as it was before the House adopted this amendment to an appropriation
bill, has been reinstated and... the decision of the Supreme Court in the Sung case
will be the law of the land when this code is adopted.
Id. at 4416 (remarks of Representative Walter). See note 19 supra, and note 103 infra.
63. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
64. Id. at 305-10. But see id. at 316-18 (Black and Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting). The
majority opinion argued convincingly that despite the fact that "exemptions from the
terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed," id. at 310, in
this case, the laborious effort and detail evident in the passage and provisions of § 242(b)
could not be ignored. As against this, the dissent relied on remarks contained in the
debates to the effect that the APA remained applicable, ignoring the variety of meanings
which may be given to the "applicability" of the APA. See note 86 infra.
65. The Court dismissed the argument that the hearing procedure of § 242(b) of
the 1952 act was unconstitutional in a single sentence which totally ignored the history
of the APA and the rationale of Wong Yang Sung decision:
The contention is without substance when considered against the long-standing
practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in
the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to deportation
which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad dis-
cretion in immigration matters.
Id. at 311.
Justice Black's dissent claimed that statutory construction made it unnecessary to reach
the constitutional issue, id. at 316, but after describing the legislative history relied on, he
concluded his opinion in a manner highly reminiscent of Wong Yang Sung:
The idea of letting a prosecutor judge the very case he prosecutes or supervise and
control the job of the judge before whom his case is presented is wholly inconsistent
with our concepts of justice. It was this principle on which Congress presumably
acted in passing the Procedure Act . . . . It is hard to defend the fairness of a
practice that subjects judges to the power and control of prosecutors. Human nature
has not put an impassable barrier between subjection and subserviency, particularly
when job security is at stake. That Congress was aware of this is shown by the
Procedure Act, and we should not construe the Immigration Act on a contrary
assumption.
Id. at 318-19.
Cf. text at note 108 infra. In contrast to this method, Justice Douglas, also dissenting,
said that the provision under which Marcello was ordered deported was an unconstitutional
ex post facto law. Id. at 319.
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the specific issue decided in Marcello.66 Consequently, even if Marcello were
to be decided the same way today, that fact alone would not necessarily
vitiate the Wong Yang Sung rationale. 67
The continued vitality and general applicability of the Wong Yang Sung
approach is apparent in a series of cases concerning the effect on judicial
review of the APA and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Sec-
tion 242(b) of the 1952 act, relating to deportation, read in part:
In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United States
under the provisions of this chapter, or of any other law or treaty, the
decision of the Attorney General shall be final .... 68
This virtually repeated the wording of the 1917 act,6 9 which had been held
in Trinler not to be a statute precluding review. The statutory language ap-
parently precludes any judicial review of the Attorney General's decision, but,
as was successfully argued in Trinler, hundreds of cases had in fact been
heard over the years on petitions for writs of habeas corpus.70 The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service sought to reconcile statute and practice by
contending that habeas corpus, being collateral, did not constitute direct re-
view of the immigration order, and was thus consistent with the finality
prescribed by the statute.71 In response, it was argued that habeas corpus is
judicial review, and that its availability indicated that the statutory language
concerning "finality" referred solely to administrative finality.7 2
66. In the hearing afforded Marcello, there was partial separation of functions, since
there were separate officials acting as prosecutor and judge. The complaint in the case
arose because the judge was under the supervision of officials who were involved in the
investigations and prosecutions.
67. The question is moot, since in 1956, shortly after the Marcello decision, the Service
changed its rules to provide for the separation of functions by designating an Examining
Officer to present the Government's evidence; the Special Inquiry Officer's sole task now
is to hear and decide the case. 21 Fed. Reg. 97-102 (1956) ; see 1955-56 INS ANN. REP.
15-16. The new procedure has been criticized as not going far enough, since it applies only
in the twenty per cent of the cases which are contested, thus retaining the single officer
procedure to determine discretionary relief, which itself is sought in 80% of all applica-
tions, in the other cases. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform,
56 COLUm. L. REV. 309, 352 (1956).
68. Section 242(b), INA, 66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958).
69. See note 46 supra.
70. See 1952-1953 INS ANN. RFsP., Table 48.
71. Brief for Respondent, pp. 20-24, 33-36, Martinez v. Neelly, 344 U.S. 916 (1953).
See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883).
Even the opposition occasionally supported the proposition that judicial review and habeas
corpus were not synonymous. Brief for Respondent, p. 13, Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349
U.S. 48 (1955). But see id. at 13 n.7.
72. See, e.g., Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, -799 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The
formulation often did not attempt to define the meaning of the finality provision beyond
the point of saying that in fact there was no finality. See, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229, 239 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This solution may implicitly have
contained the definition of final as administratively final, but as stated, it meant that the
Administrative Procedure Act rendered § 19(a) of the Immigration Act void.
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In Heikkila v. Barber,8 the Supreme Court ruled on the effect of the APA
on judicial review under the 1917 act.74 Adopting the Service's interpreta-
tion of habeas corpus as being more limited in scope and therefore different
from judicial review, the Court held that the 1917 act precluded judicial re-
view "to the fullest extent possible."7 5 Thus, the review provisions of the
APA did not apply, and habeas corpus remained the only means available
for attacking deportation and exclusion orders. The opinion contained a
footnote disclaiming any intention of determining the effect of the newly-
passed 1952 act,78 but the similarity of the provisions in question encouraged
the expectation that the new act would be construed as the old one had been.
7 T
73. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
74. The Immigration and Nationality Act was passed on June 27, 1952; Helkkila v.
Barber was decided on March 16, 1953. Between those dates, the Supreme Court heard
and decided Martinez v. Neelly, 344 U.S. 916 (1953). In that case, Martinez filed a
complaint under § 10 of the APA to review a deportation order. The district court held
the APA inapplicable, but upheld the validity of the order anyway. The decision was not
reported, but is given at Transcript of Record, pp. 15-18, Martinez v. Neelly, supra. The
circuit court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the applicability of the APA,
since it agreed that the order was valid whether the APA applied or not. Martinez v.
Neelly, 197 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1952). Thus the basis on which the dismissal was affirmed
was not clear. The petitioner's brief relied primarily on the substantive issues in the case,
while the respondent's brief discussed solely the question whether the form of the suit
was proper. Respondent then submitted a reply brief arguing that the applicability of the
APA had not been adequately considered below, and was hence not suitable for argument
before the Supreme Court. Reply Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-11, Martinez v. Neelly, 344
U.S. 916 (1953). Martinez pointed out that the applicability of the APA was the chief
issue in Heikkila v. Barber, in which by that time the Supreme Court had noted probable
jurisdiction. Id. at 8.
On January 12, 1953, the Supreme Court affirmed by a divided court, 4-4. Mr. Justice
Clark did not sit, and neither the voting nor the reasoning of the Court was disclosed.
The personnel of the Court was the same in Martinez as in Heikkila. It is difficult to
explain a vote to reverse in Martinez in any other way than as a vote for the applicability
of the review provisions of the APA, but, whereas four Justices voted to reverse in
Martinez, only two dissented in Heikkila.
75. 345 U.S. at 235-36. In addition to Trinler, Heikkila rejected the decisions of two
other circuits, Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Prince v. Com-
missioner, 185 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1950). The Court also distinguished two earlier Supreme
Court cases granting declaratory judgments, on the grounds that these cases involved
not merely the validity of a deportation order, but rather the alien's status. Perkins v.
Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (claim of citizenship) ; McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162
(1950) (claim of eligibility to citizenship-new ground, not determinative in court of
appeals case, supra).
The Court analogized Perkins to Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), which
held that due process for a resident claiming citizenship meant judicial process. No
authority was given, however, for treating eligibility for citizenship as a matter of status,
nor was it shown why any status short of citizenship should come within the rule in
Ng F ng Ho, rather than within the rule in ordinary deportation cases. 345 U.S. at 236.
76. 345 U.S. at 232 n.4.
77. At least some courts thought so. See cases cited in Brief for Petitioner, p. 18 n.1,
Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954) ; see also Batista v. Nichols, 213 F.2d 20
(Ist Cir. 1954). But see Note, 62 YAi. L.J. 1000, 1006-07 (1953).
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The issue was reopened, however, when the Supreme Court, by a 4-4 vote,
affirmed the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Brownell
v. Rubinstein 78 that a deportation order was reviewable under the 1952 act by
means other than habeas corpus. 79 And the following year, in Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro,80 the Supreme Court affirmatively held that deportation could be
tested under the general provisions of the APA. On its face, Pedreiro simply
found that "final" in the 1952 act did not have the same meaning as "final"
in the 1917 act. Because the two cases involved different immigration statutes,
the opinion in Pedreiro did not directly overrule Heikkila, but the language
and rationale left little doubt that Heikkila was repudiated. Both cases turned
on the effect of the APA, but each emphasized a different effect. Heikkila
looked to the effect of section 10 on previously existing statutes:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review .. . any person
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action ... shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof 81
as an indication that the act did not expand judicial review previously limited
by another statute. Pedreiro, on the other hand, proceeded from the general
grant of review to concentrate on the effect of section 12 on subsequently
enacted statutes:
No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the pro-
visions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so
expressly.
8 2
The possibilities of a shifting stance were fully exploited. Whereas Heikkila
was denied APA review because section 10 had been read in the light of the
1917 act, Pedreiro was able to bring a suit because the 1952 act was read
in the light of section 12 alone, ignoring section 10. The Court held APA
review applicable since the new act contained "no language which 'expressly'
supersede[d] or modifie[d]" the "expanded right of review granted by sec-
tion 10."133 This sleight-of-hand ignored the earlier ruling in Heikkila that
section 10 had not granted an expanded right of review,8 4 and it may have
78. Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954), affirming by a divided court Rubin-
stein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Mr. Justice Clark did not participate in
the case.
79. The decision in the circuit court in Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (1953)
was based on an affirmative finding that the legislative history of the 1952 act indicated
the intention to make immigration orders reviewable. The First Circuit, on the other
hand, found that the 1952 act codified existing law, and since existing law, according to
Heikkila, did not provide review, habeas corpus remained the only remedy. Batista v.
Nichols, 213 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1954).
80. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
81. Section 10, APA, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
82. Section 12, APA, 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958).
83. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at 51.
84. See 349 U.S. at 55 (Minton, J., joined by Reed and Burton, JJ., dissenting).
19621
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
been used primarily to avoid overruling Heikkila.85 Thus, although the deci-
sion that the proceedings under the 1952 act were subject to APA review was
supported by some disputed legislative history,86 Pedreiro was primarily
85. The opinion in Pedreiro was written by Mr. Justice Black, a dissenter in Heikkila.
Mr. Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion in Heikkila, joined the majority in Pedreiro, one
of two Justices-together with Mr. Justice Douglas-who changed votes between the two
cases. Of the seven Justices in the majority in Heikkila:
three (Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Burton, and Mr. Justice Minton) dissented in
Pedreiro;
two (Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Douglas) changed sides and joined the
majority in Pedreiro;
two (Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Jackson) left the Court.
The situation was further complicated by the 4-4 votes in Martinez and Rubinstein.
The personnel in Heikkila was the same as in Afartinez; when Rubinstein was decided,
Mr. Chief Justice Warren had replaced Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, and by the time of
Pedreiro, Mr. Justice Harlan had replaced Mr. Justice Jackson. The history of close
and changing votes required Mr. Justice Black to be cautious in rejecting any early
reasoning. Thus, it is probable that, whatever the merits, an opinion based on a new
ground might have a better chance of holding the votes needed for a majority.
86. The legislative history of the 1952 act on the subject of judicial review beyond
habeas corpus is susceptible to opposing interpretations. The indications in favor of ex-
panded review are chiefly statements that the Administrative Procedure Act was ap-
plicable:
Now, we come to this question of the finality of the decision of the Attorney Gen-
eral. That language means that it is a final decision as far as the administrative
branch of the Government is concerned, but it is not final in that it is not the last
remedy that the alien has. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act is ap-
plicable. From that decision an appeal lies in the courts.
98 CONG. REc. 4416 (1952) (remarks of Representative Walter). "The Administrative
Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill." 98 CONG. REc. 5778 (1952) (remarks of
Senator McCarran). The history of the hearing provisions indicates that a procedure may
be within the APA without being governed by the board APA grants. See notes 52, 58, 62,
64 supra. Representative Walter followed the sentence quoted above with these words:
... the law as it was before the House adopted this amendment to an appropria-
tion bill, has been reinstated and . . . the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Sung case will be the law of the land when this code is adopted.
98 CONG. REc. at 4416. This means, apparently, that § 7 of the APA applies to the INS
without mentioning that § 7(a) would exempt it. See 98 CONG. RFc. 5625-26 (1952).
In the same manner, § 10 of the APA can apply to the INS and except it at the same
time. Indeed, it may be considered that any agency action not exempted from the require-
ments of the APA in so many words is within the framework of the APA. See notes 19, 39
supra and note 103 infra. In this sense, even the decision in Heikkila v. Barber was one
within the APA framework. Representative Walter's statement, moreover, was made in
opposition to an amendment, see 98 CONG. REc. at 4414, which would have specifically pro-
vided for judicial review. The amendment was defeated, and the finality language remained
in §§ 236 and 242. These statements, furthermore, were made by the two legislators most
expert in immigration matters, who as the co-authors of the APA were fully aware of its
applications and exceptions.
The Conference report concluded in these general terms:
Having extensively considered the problem of judicial review, the conferees are
satisfied that procedures provided in the bill, adapted to the necessities of national
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based on what the Court described as the "generous" attitude of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act toward judicial review Sr-an attitude which was
equally applicable before the passage of the 1952 act, and which indeed
formed the basis of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Heikkila.88
The same arguments about the difference between habeas corpus and
judicial review which had been successful in Heikkila were rejected in
Pedreiro.8 9 In the earlier case, the "collateral review" on habeas corpus was
characterized by a narrow scope of inquiry, described in these terms:
Regardless of whether or not the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus has
been expanded, the function of the courts has always been limited to the
enforcement of due process requirements . . . In short, it is the scope
of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates use of the writ from
judicial review as that term is used in the Administrative Procedure
Act .... 0
security and the protection of economic and social welfare of the citizens of this
country, remain within the framework and the pattern of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The safeguard of judicial procedure is afforded the alien in both ex-
clusion and deportation proceedings.
H.R. REP. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1952). The background of this language
was the proposal and deletion of a section, contained in early versions of the bill, which
would specifically have limited review to habeas corpus. See note 103 infra. The vagueness
of the term "safeguard of judicial procedure" may have been designed to pacify objectors
to the limited review of deportation orders; see, e.g., Joint Hearings ont S. 716, H.R.
2379, and H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 417-22, 489-91, 526-34, 575-80, 590-91 (1951)
(testimony of various witnesses). That the "safeguard of judicial procedure" could easily
have referred to habeas corpus is shown by the 1950 report, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 629 (1950), which in a brief paragraph under the heading "Judicial Review,"
mentioned only habeas corpus, saying that the writ was the proper remedy to determine
the legality of detention under an order of the INS.
Concerning the deletion of language limiting review to habeas corpus, the Senate
Committee said:
The omission of the language is not intended to grant any review of determinations
made by consular officers, nor to expand judicial review in immigration cases
beyond that under existing law.
S. REp. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1952). The term "existing law" is again sus-
ceptible to opposing interpretations, for it may refer to the long history of Supreme Court
decisions limiting review to habeas corpus, or it may be read in light of Trinler and the
other circuit court cases expanding the form of review. See Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206
F.2d 449, 454 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Heikkila had not yet been decided.
The indefinite language, the nature of the INA as a codification, and the virtual repeti-
tion of the words used in the 1917 act indicate at least that there was no clear-cut ex-
pression that review was not to be limited to habeas corpus. Thus, if Heikkila was an
accurate expression of the state of the pre-1952 law, such a significant change as occurred
from Hcikkila to Pedreiro must have been based on some factor other than the legisla-
tive history of the 1952 act.
87. 349 U.S. at5l.
88. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 238 (1953) (joined by Black, J.).
89. The brief in Pedreiro rested heavily on the Heikkila decision. See Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 10-14, Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
90. 345 U.S. at 236.
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This formulation ignored the rationale underlying Wong Yang Sung, by
failing to realize that the requirements of the APA, the expanding concept of
due process, and the expanding scope of inquiry on habeas corpus were all
facets of the same development. Because the Heikkila decision was based on
a difference in scope of inquiry between habeas corpus and APA review, and
because the Court not only failed to fix the difference permanently, but in
fact admitted that the scope of habeas corpus might be expanding, the Heikkila
holding was a pyrrhic victory for the INS.9' Read out of the APA in Heikkila,
the Wong Yang Sung rationale retained force through the expanding scope
of habeas corpus, thus permitting the continued application of developing
standards of due process to the INS. In this sense, therefore, the Court in
Heikkila was simultaneously espousing two contradictory concepts, and thus
the decisive question concerning the scope of judicial supervision over adminis-
trative determinations in immigration matters remained open. 2 And Pedreiro,
on this analysis, can be viewed, not simply as a sub silentio overruling of
Heikkila, but rather as a recognition of the interrelationship between the APA
requirements and the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings.03
91. Perhaps not even the INS was optimistic about the possibility of a holding limit-
ing the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus. In oral argument in Martinez v. Neelly, 344
U.S. 916 (1953), the Solicitor General admitted the general belief within the profession
that the Supreme Court, by then, was considering the same issues on habeas corpus as on
appeal. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 n.15 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
92. A lack of permanence was perhaps inevitable, for the word "final" itself was not
a constant, as the Heikkila opinion recognized when it said that the use of the word "final"
did not settle the question. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 233 (1953). The Court then
found that "final" as used in the 1917 act meant that there was no true judicial review.
Id. at 233-35.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting from Heikkila, criticized technical readings limit-
ing the application of the APA. He argued that the legislative history indicated that
Congress had not used the phrase "preclude judicial review" in a formal sense, citing re-
marks of Senator McCarran, co-author of the APA:
He was not talking about "review" in any technical sense. He was talking about
the opportunity to go into court and question what an administrative body had
done.
345 U.S. at 239. But even the narrowest reading of that Act should have refuted any
claim that judicial review "as that term is used in the Administrative Procedure Act"
did not include habeas corpus:
The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be [in the absence or inadequacy
of a special statutory review proceeding] ... any applicable form of legal action
(including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory
injunction or habeas corpus) ....
Section 10(b), APA, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1958) (italics added).
93. The extinction of a difference in the scope of review destroyed the Service's
alternate argument, which it had previously used in Martinez v. Neelly and Heikkila v.
Barber, although the Court never made reference to it. This was the argument that
whereas the phrase "MThen judicial review is precluded . . ." would mean that the APA
was applicable unless there was no review whatsoever, the phrase actually used, "Except
so far as . . ." made the APA applicable only to the extent that there was review. Brief
for Respondents, pp. 33-36, Martinez v. Neelly, 344 U.S. 916 (1953). See DAvis, ADmINIS-
TRATIvW LAw TREATiSE 828 (1951).
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The debate concerning the distinction between the scope of inquiry in habeas
corpus and APA review was settled in 1956 with the decision in Brownell v.
Tom We Shung,9 4 an exclusion case. Since the language of the exclusion
section of the 1952 act closely resembles that of the .deportation provision,9 5
it could have been expected that the Court would follow Pedreiro in granting
a general right of judicial review. But another factor was involved: the consti-
tutional position of resident aliens, who have been entitled to due process in
deportation cases, historically differs from that of non-resident aliens, who
have not been so protected in exclusion proceedings. 96 Accordingly, the Service
contended that while residents had a presumptive right of review as part of
due process, no such presumption attached to non-residents, who had no right
to any form of due process in the absence of a specific statutory grant.97 There-
fore, it was argued, judicial review in exclusion cases should be limited to the
existing remedy of habeas corpus rather than expanded in conformity with
APA requirements. 8 A unanimous Court rejected this line of reasoning. 99
While agreeing that the scope of review might differ in deportation and exclu-
sion cases, the Court found no reason, within each of these separate categories, to
limit the forms of review available.' 00 Since this result rested on the assumption
that the scope of inquiry-within either the deportation or exclusion categories
-remained the same regardless of the form of review,10' Tom We Shung
94. 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
95. . .. [I]n every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the United
States, under this chapter or any other law or treaty now existing or hereafter
made, the decision of a special inquiry officer shall be final unless reversed on appeal
to the Attorney General.
Section 236(c), INA, 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1958).
96. Compare Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), with United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), and Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
97. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 35-37, Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
98. Id. at pp. 38-41.
99. 352 U.S. at 182-84. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARv. L. REV.
769, 793 n248 (1958). Professor Jaffe thinks that Pedreiro did rest on construction of the
1952 act. Ibid.
100. The Court accepted Tom We Shung's argument that the constitutional distinction
should be without significance when all that is involved is the form of judicial action
available, not the scope of review, saying: "We do not believe that the constitutional
status of the parties requires that the form of judicial action be strait-jacketed." 352 U.S.
at 183.
101. It does not follow that the absence of this condition [custody] would enlarge
the permissible scope of review traditionally permitted in exclusion cases. The
substantive law governing such actions would remain the rule of decision on the
merits, but the form of action would be by declaratory judgment rather than
habeas corpus.
Ibid.
Thus the Court accepted Justice Frankfurter's description of physical custody as a
mere "technical condition." Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. at 240 (Frankfurter, 3., dissent-
ing).
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marks the final abandonment of the distinction drawn in Heikkila between the
scope of inquiry in habeas corpus and judicial review.1
0 2
As a result of Pedreiro and Torn We Shung, the Supreme Court had con-
strued the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality
Act to create an unprecedented extension of the right of review, for non-
resident as well as resident aliens. To this, Congress reacted, much as it had to
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, by enacting H.R. 187, a special statutory
scheme for review of immigration orders, to supersede the APA. 03
102. In the end, the three cases, Heikkila, Pedreiro, and Torn We Shung, formed a
fairly well-defined circle. The result in Heikkila was based on the supposed difference in
scope of habeas corpus and APA review, thus leaving open the possibility that if the differ-
ence ceased to exist, there would be no bar to APA review. Pedreiro, then, removed the
bar by finding that habeas corpus was as wide as APA review. Toni We Stung, on the
other hand, removed the bar by reversing the method and finding, if habeas corpus review
was narrower in exclusion than deportation, that APA review could also be narrower in
one set of proceedings than in the other.
The existence of "different measures of review even within the confines of the APA,"
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARv. L. REV. 769, 794 (1958), fulfilled the
"prophecy" of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Heikkila: "A declaratory judgment action
under § 10(b) can be limited-as it should be--to the scope of review appropriate to the
extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus." 345 U.S. at 240.
This argument was advanced to meet the majority's expression of a fear that APA
review as described in § 10(e) was rigid; consequently to apply it to deportation would
result in an extension of review beyond the existing substantive limits. Cf. United States
v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 672 (1949). This fear was dismissed in the Torn We Shun opinion,
see note 101 supra, written by Justice Clark, who had also written the Heikkila opinion.
But granting that the APA, as a statute, did not enlarge the scope of review, it does
not follow that the APA may not be a constitutional vehicle for the enlargement.
103. The Committee Report states that the new act "implements and applies section
10" of the APA. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 1. However, as demonstrated by the
course of events concerning the applicability of the APA hearing provisions, see notes 52,
62 supra, the Committee's statement is not necessarily the equivalent of saying that the new
act is "strictly in accordance with the spirit and intent of the APA," despite the claim to
that effect by Representative Walter, 107 CONG. REc. 11332 (daily ed. July 10, 1961). See
note 86 supra.
H.R. 187 is inserted as § 106 of the 1952 act. Early versions of that act contained a
§ 106 which would have expressly limited review in the entire area to habeas corpus:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law-
(a) determinations of fact by administrative officers under the provisions of this
Act or regulations issued thereunder shall not be subject to review by any court;
(b) determinations of law . . . shall not be subject to review by any court except
through the writ of habeas corpus; and
(c) the exercise of discretionary authority . . . shall not be subject to review by
any court.
Section 106(a), S. 716, H.R. 2379, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
After Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954), the Attorney General proposed a
bill to settle the problem of j-adicial review. That bill resembled H.R. 187 in prescribing a
petition for review to test deportation orders, and limiting excluded aliens to habeas corpus.
Some of the limitations on the petition for review in H.R. 187 were absent in the early
version, but the res judicata provision was included. See text of bill quoted in Brief for




The dialogue between the courts and Congress concerning judicial super-
vision of immigration matters is hardly unique.10 4 The fact that it is conducted
on the level of statutory construction, however, may prove on analysis to be
deceptive. A functional assessment of the purposes served by such a dialogue
must begin with the familiar doctrine of checks and balances. The judicial
check on the legislature is generally defined as the power to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional, but it is unrealistic to ignore the courts' role in in-
terpreting statutes even when no constitutional defects are noticed. Both logic
and history indicate that the Supreme Court may temper the will of Congress
as much in construing a statute as in striking one down on constitutional
grounds. Such modification may run along a continuum from reinforcement
to frustration, with varying effects on the nature of the congressional re-
action.10r,
So long as no constitutional doubts are explicitly sounded, the problem is
regarded solely as one of applying legislative policy. In such a case there is
room for the exercise of the congressional reprise: Congress may act again,
and reverse or modify the Supreme Court's decision, either by clarifying its
legislative intent, or by adjusting its policy in the light of the Court's demon-
stration of the perhaps unforeseen effects of the former policy. 0 6 In many
instances, furthermore, such a "legislative" decision may well be intended to
prompt precisely this type of response,10 7 in contrast to a constitutional de-
104. See note 5 supra. In Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939), the Supreme Court
construed a cause for deportation requiring membership in or affiliation with the Com-
munist Party to signify present membership or affiliation. The Alien Registration Act of
1940, § 23, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), superseded by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(28), 1251(6) (1958),
reversed this interpretation. Then in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), the Court
rested its decision invalidating a deportation order on the limited meaning of "member-
ship" and "affiliation."
105. By the "nature" of the congressional reaction to the decision, is meant not only
the degree to which its response accepts and incorporates the Court's decision, but the de-
gree to which Congress is able to respond at all, or in responding, to face the Court's de-
cision squarely. The often cumbrous mechanism of Congress enhances the inertia effect of
the Court's decision. See Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions-1945-
1957, 71 H~Av. L. REv. 1324 (1958). But the inertia effect is not always great. See, e.g.,
Portal-to-Portal Act, 61 Stat. 84 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 251-62 (1958). Prompting this
act were cases such as Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscada Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) ; Jewell
Ridge Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945) ; Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
106. The likelihood of congressional action if a certain choice is made by the Supreme
Court may itself have some weight in the Court's decision. In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357
U.S. 185 (1958), the Court refused to treat non-resident aliens on parole within this
country as residents for purposes of suspension of deportation in anticipation of physical
persecution. The opinion, based on statutory construction and legislative intent, concluded
by observing that an expansion of the rights of excluded aliens on parole might lead to
congressional action limiting parole.
107. Cf. Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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cision, which prospectively limits Congress in the specified areas by foreclos-
ing certain policy choices or means of execution.
The judicial preference for avoiding constitutional issues is based on a
reluctance to foreclose an area prematurely, in the hope that congressional
responses will either accommodate themselves to the Court's views or further
illuminate the area in question. Even where constitutional issues are not
raised explicitly, however, any case involving statutory construction may in
fact be quasi-constitutional if the construction is chosen in order to avoid a
constitutional issue.x0 8 A decision may also be considered quasi-constitutional
whenever the construction selected has been dictated by overriding considera-
tions, such as federalism, institutional competency, or a basic policy like the
preservation of economic competition."°9 Thus, a decision construing a statute
cannot necessarily be classified as either constitutional or "legislative," and the
congressional reprise is similarly unclassifiable. Congress, if it acts at all, as-
sumes by its reprise that the issue is political, but the classification can finally
be determined only by a new Court decision. The Supreme Court may acquiesce
in the congressional determination, thus acknowledging the political nature of
the question, or if forced by the reprise to abandon the quasi-constitutional
technique, it may address itself directly to the constitutional objections.
Yet the Court may do neither of these things. It may, instead, resort once
again to the techniques of statutory construction. And when the reprise goes
beyond its initial level, and becomes a series of statutes and decisions reacting
to each other, a description of the process as a dispute over the application of
legislative policy appears considerably less than satisfactory. Nor can the
uncertainties be attributed solely to difficulties of institutional accommodation;
rather, they may inhere in the very nature of the subject matter of the
dialogue. This is especially true in the area of immigration, where the quasi-
constitutional hints given in Wong Yang Sung acquire increasing importance
as the already lengthy dialogue enters a new stage with the passage of H.R.
187.
THE DuA NATURE OF ImmIGRATION
The susceptibility of immigration to a classification blurred between the
"legislative" and the constitutional should not be surprising in view of the
anatomy of the field: it is composed of two basic issues-political control over
the borders, and constitutional due process-each of which, if taken separate-
ly, would lead to opposite conclusions. Thus, if the claimants were not aliens,
108. Thus this quasi-constitutional technique may be at the root of any decision based
on seemingly erroneous or inapposite statutory construction or application. Cf. Bickel and
Wellington, mipra note 107, at 31-35.
109. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940), where the de-
cision was justified as preventing "every strike in modern industry" from being brought
within the federal jurisdiction. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
there were involved both questions of federalism and institutional competency-whether
the courts are suited to making labor law. In the realm of statutes embodying overriding




and if they were claiming something other than authorization to enter or
remain in this country, their cases would involve simply questions of personal
liberty and would have admittedly to be conducted according to constitutional
standards of due process. 110 And if the claim did not involve personal liberty,
it would be analogous to the virtually absolute power given Congress in the
area of foreign commerce."'
Congress has traditionally proceeded on the assumption that political con-
trol over borders is the only important consideration in this area, 1 2 an as-
110. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1921).
111. See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884). For an ex-
ample of the feeling that due process is a vital protection but only for citizens, see ALSOP &
ALsop, THE REPORTER'S TRADE 177 (1958).
112. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1952). See also id. at 6-24.
A common attitude toward deportation is reflected in the history of a series of bills
concerning detention of aliens whose deportation orders could not be executed. These bills,
H.R. 5643, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) ; H.R. 3, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) ; H.R. 10,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), proposed to allow the Secretary of Labor (in the last bill, the
Attorney General) to detain indefinitely any alien ordered deported whose order could not
be executed. The proponents of the bills cited repeated holdings that deportation is a civil
process, and argued that detention in pursuance of deportation, no matter of what duration,
was equally civil. Many deportations were impossible to execute at the time of the first two
bills because of a lack of European sailings, and opponents of the bills called them "concen-
tration camp" bills. 87 CoNG. Rzc. 8985 (1941). The civil nature of the bills was weakened
by the attitude of many of the supporters. Representative Michener acknowledged in 1939
that the bill pending was designed to get 50 "alien reds." 84 CoNG. REc. 5166 (1949). And
in response to a suggestion that bail be allowed, Representative Hobbs, the sponsor replied:
The gentleman forgets that these aliens affected by this bill have been convicted and
sentenced. It is because the execution of that sentence has become impossible that we
deny them bail. It is utterly absurd to talk about giving any discretionary power to
admit to bail a man who has been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
87 CONG. Rac. 8993 (1941).
The 1949 bill also contained sections exempting the INS from the APA. See note 52
supra. The House Report described the bill in these terms:
The section will go far to prevent conflicts between these branches [executive and
judicial] and in line with the quotation above from the Fong Yue Ting case [plenary
power of Congress in immigration] will return without doubt to the political branch
of the government certain functions which historically have been vested in that
branch, with Supreme Court approval, instead of being subject to possible inroads
by the judiciary.
H.R. REP. No. 1192,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
The intent of these bills may be gauged from the expression in the 1949 report that if
the bill allowing detention had been in effect before, it would have prevented the escape of
Gerhart Eisler. Ibid. But the object of the deportation order was supposedly to remove
Eisler from the country, an object which he attained through self-help. See id. at 17
(minority report).
After the 1939 bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 289-61, it died in the
Senate. None of the other bills was passed by either house, but the momentum ultimately
accomplished passage of section 242(c) of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66
Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1958).
The most extreme example of Congress' proceeding on, the assumption of absolute
power is the passage by a vote of 330-42 in the House of Representatives, 86 CONG. REc.
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sumption mirrored in judicial statements that Congress has plenary power
over immigration.'" But plenary power to choose a policy may not mean
plenary power to effect it." 4 Thus, even assuming that Congress can in-
corporate any standards and classifications it chooses into the immigration
law, it does not follow that it is free to choose the means of crrying them
out. Early cases, it is true, characterized congressional power as absolute, but
they dealt primarily with the power to set standards for exclusion and de-
portation, rather than with the process by which such standards were imple-
mented."i 5 And in 1902, in the Japanese Immigration Case,"16 in the course
of a decision requiring hearings in deportation proceedings, the Court held that
resident aliens were entitled to due process:
But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as hold-
ing, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute
involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in "due process of law" as understood at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution."'
7
The holding of the Japanese Immigration Case was limited by the courts to
deportation cases."i 8 In the area of exclusion, the theory of unlimited power
8215 (1940), of H.R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), which directed the Attorney
General "to take into custody forthwith and deport forthwith to Australia . . . the alien,
Harry Renton Bridges, whose presence in this country the Congress deems hurtful." See
H.R. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). See also id., pt. 2. The Senate Commit-
tee on Immigration substituted a bill calling instead for an investigation of Bridges, S. REp.
No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), and the House bill was never passed. The Senate
committee's action was spurred at least in part by a fear that the bill might be held to be a
bill of attainder. Id. at 6-7. The requirements of a bill of attainder are punishment, directed
by the legislature, at a named class of people. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
It was probably feared that the naming of a single individual would be extreme enough
together with the seriousness of deportation to make this a bill of attainder even in the face
of numerous decisions characterizing deportation as not punishment. See, e.g., Bugajewitz
v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). Underlying this feel-
ing may have been the fear that not only would H.R. 9766 be declared a bill of attainder,
but that it would provide the precedent for other decisions further weakening the doctrine
of deportation as non-punishment, a doctrine which supports the entire unwieldy structure
of the administrative regulation of immigration. See note 144 infra.
113. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-16 (1893). Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952). See also Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Law-
fully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69
YALE L.J. 262 (1959).
114. 'Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157-66 (Murphy, J., concurring). See Hesse,
The Constitutional Status of Lawfully Admitted Permanent Aliens: The Pre-1917 Cases,
68 YALE L.J. 1578, 1605-09 (1959).
115. See Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581
(1889) ; Ekin v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 798 (1893).
116. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
117. Id. at 100.
118. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ; Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Distinctions have even been made
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has been reaffirmed in the most sweeping terms in recent years, though by the
narrowest of margins.'1 9 Thus, in 1953, the Supreme Court reiterated the
earlier dictum that "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.' 1 20 Nor was this
an exaggeration, for the result of that case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei,121 was to deny a hearing to an excluded alien 122 who had formerly
lived in the United States for twenty-five years, whose family were American
citizens, and who, having found no other country which would admit him,
quite likely could have spent the rest of his life in civil detention on Ellis
Island.123
In part, this doctrine stemmed from the view that the Constitution lacked
extraterritorial authority, an assumption considerably weakened by recent
trends of decisions. 124 Even if the non-resident alien were entitled to no
between resident and non-resident aliens when there is a claim of citizenship. In Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), a deportation case, the claim of citizenship was con-
sidered so important that due process was held to demand judicial process, a trial de novo
on the issue of citizenship. But an earlier case denying a trial de novo for a non-resident citi-
zenship claimant has not been overturned, despite the lack of a significant basis for distinc-
tion in the area of citizenship claimants. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
There are distinctions within categories of aliens too, the requirement of procedural due
process in deportation cases has not been broadened to include substantive due process. See
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) ; Harrisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952) ; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). But it may still be doubted
whether Congress could require the deportation of all members of a totally arbitrarily
chosen class, or a class chosen on the basis of, say, religion. Cf. United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
119. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) was decided by
a vote of 4-3; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), by a
vote of 5-4. Of the majority in both cases, only Mr. Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion
in Mezei, decided the same day as Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), still sits on the
Supreme Court. It is true that none of the dissenters denied that Congress has absolute
power over non-resident aliens, but cf. note 65 supra.
120. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, quoting United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. at 544.
121. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
122. In any special case the alien may be denied a hearing before a board of special
inquiry if the Attorney General determines that he is excludable under one of the
categories set forth in § 175.53 on the basis of information of a confidential nature,
the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.
8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (Supp. 1947). Cf. section 235(c), INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1958).
123. After months of detention, the INS appointed a special committee to hear Mezei's
case. The committee found him excludable as a Communist but recommended that he be
paroled [into this country] indefinitely. The Attorney General accepted the recommenda-
tion and Mezei was released. See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70
HARv. L. REv. 193, 251 (1956). The Knauff case, however, cast even greater doubt on the
original decision to withhold a hearing when the Board of Immigration Appeals, after a
Board of Special Inquiry held her excludable, reversed for a lack of proper evidence. See
KNAuFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY, Appendix (1952).
124. Compare In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) with Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d
961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
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constitutional protection,'125 it would not follow that the exclusion power is
unlimited, for to allow Congress to act totally at will-let alone to delegate
such authority to an administrative agency-is inconsistent with the concept
of responsible government. 126 The logic of the deportation cases rests not
simply on the rights of residents, but on the requirement that agents of the
government may not act arbitrarily. Such a focus on the source of a govern-
ment official's power rather than on the source of the injured party's claim
argues strongly against a distinction between exclusion and deportation
cases.
127
763 (1950) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
125. The failure to extend constitutional protection to aliens seeking to enter, appar-
ently stems from the doctrine that aliens have no right to enter, but enter as a privilege.
See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Since Congress
could exclude them altogether it may impose any conditions on their entry. This persistent
doctrine has analogies in other fields, the most controversial being government employ-
ment. The doctrine in general is discussed in Davis, Requirement of a Trial-Type Hear-
ing, 70 HARV. L. REv. 193, 222-80 (1956). The present position of the right-privilege
dichotomy is not clear. See Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ;
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally dividcd
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). But see Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Weiman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
126. In certain areas, such as the conduct of foreign affairs and military affairs and
the choosing of policy-making officials, responsibility, or accountability, is inappropriate. It
is difficult to see, however, how immigration, involving the disposition of individuals, is
comparable. The closest parallel is with the Draft Cases, in which the statute also made
the administrative order--classification and induction-final. Even there, where military
reasons make the administrative action one of great importance, a registrant wrongly classi-
fied may obtain judicial review, since "final" has been held only to limit the scope of review.
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). It is in the execution of an exclusion
order concerning an alien within the United States that the statement in Knauff and Mezei
that Congress may prescribe any process for aliens seeking to enter, see note 120 supra,
is most defective. For it must be true that there are some limits. It would be unthinkable
that Congress could authorize the INS to knock on the alien's door at 3:00 A.M. and
remove him from the country as soon as he answered the door. Cf. Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv.
L. Rxv. 1362, 1394 (1953). Even in Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953), Mezei was able to bring the writ of habeas corpus, presumably on the theory that
habeas corpus is a right against the custodian, irrespective of the status of the prisoner.
Yet when it came to the inquiry on habeas corpus, the Court looked to the status of the
party demanding the hearing.
... one who lacks a right to a government gratuity may nevertheless have a "right"
to fair treatment in the distribution of the gratuity.
Davis, supra note 125, at 225. See also Hart, supra at 1391-96 (1953).
127. The illogic of distinguishing between resident and non-resident aliens when the
issue is the responsibility of government action is demonstrated by contrasting the reason-
ing in the Japanese Immigrant Case, see text at note 117 supra, with the language in the
Knauff opinion:
Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry
into the United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly
[Vol. 71:760
DEPORTATION AND EXCLUSION
The Committee Report on H.R. 187, in arguing that the excluded alien
would not be deprived of any rights by being limited to review by habeas
corpus, emphasized the expansion of the scope of inquiry under that writ.1
28
But those who are not in custody have no opportunity to benefit from the
expansion of habeas corpus, for custody is a necessary prerequisite to the
writ.120 Thus, while a resident alien can obtain review at his own instance in
the form of a petition for review, without going into custody, the non-resident
alien, in order to obtain similar relief, must wait until he is taken or sur-
renders himself into custody.
0 I
Furthermore, the fact of physical presence alone is not sufficient to consti-
tute residence for purposes of immigration procedures, despite the holding
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins '3 ' that due process is applicable to all persons within
the "territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 32 Numerous cases seem to
indicate that the distinction between resident and non-resident aliens turns on
the origin of the motive force for entry: a self-propelled entry, even sneaking
across a border, if successful, constitutes entry and residence, while being
brought in by the Service, or being caught sneaking in, constitutes no entry
and non-residence.1
33
The growing practice of paroling aliens in this country pending determina-
tion of admissibility or execution of exclusion orders 134 makes this more than
an academic problem, for parole probably does not constitute custody within
authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the govern-
ment to exclude a given alien.
338 U.S. at 543.
128. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 3, at 17-19.
129. See note 31 supra.
130. Unless the alien surrenders himself at the port of arrival, which in Tom We
Shung's case meant a trip from his "home" in Philadelphia to San Francisco, Brief for
Respondent, p. 32, Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956), he must wait in
readiness for the INS to take him into custody at any time, even after many years. In ad-
dition to the uncertainty, the alien must be prepared at all times to institute habeas corpus
proceedings in the short time before he is removed.
While the non-resident alien physically present within the United States is incon-
venienced by the limitation to habeas corpus, aliens abroad are unable to bring suit at all.
The primary effect of this is to foreclose any review of visa denials. A footnote in Brownell
v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1955) purported to limit the holding there to non-
resident aliens in this country, but Congress may have thought that the next extension
would come in this area. The deletion of § 106 from the INA of 1952 was accompanied by
the statement that the deletion was not intended to provide any review of consular deci-
sions. See note 86 mtpra.
131. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
132. Id. at 369.
133. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193
(1958) ; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-15 (1953).
134. 1954-1955 INS ANN. REP. 5-6; 1955-1956 INS ANN. REP. 5-6. See also United
States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
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the meaning of habeas corpus.13 5 Thus, the presence of large numbers of
paroled aliens further trivializes the "constitutional" distinction, for no matter
how long an excluded alien's parole lasts, no matter what roots he establishes,
he is still not considered to have made an "entry," and his exclusion order may
be carried out at any time, and without a hearing.1 36 Whatever validity there
is to a constitutional distinction between persons characterized as resident or
non-resident aliens, it becomes highly questionable where the distinction, based
on the chance of location, ignores such factors as prior residence, or strength
of ties with this country.137 Where even the circumstance of location becomes
irrelevant, however, the distinction represents a meaningless triumph of form
over substance.
H.R. 187 is striking, then, in restoring and strengthening this distinction
between resident and non-resident in an area in which Pedreiro and Tow We
Shung had emasculated it. An unfortunate consequence illustrating the arti-
ficiality of distinctions based on location, is the inducement given the Service
by the new bill to accomplish deportation by virtual kidnapping. Thus,
although in practice the Service generally stays execution of orders for
some time,138 it is legally free to execute such orders at any time between
the issuance of the order and the institution of judicial proceedings, 3 0
a freedom emphasized by the act:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the Attorney General
to defer deportation of an alien after issuance of a deportation order be-
cause of the right of review of the order granted by this section.1
40
And if deportation is once accomplished under the new act, the case is at an
end:
135. There is apparently a slight modification of the requirement of custody as a
prerequisite to habeas corpus situations. An alien, in custody but subject upon release to
a detainer by the INS, is considered to be in "technical custody" sufficient to bring habeas
corpus. See Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
136. Although in many cases, the alien is paroled after a hearing, his stay in this
country should warrant a new hearing to consider any factors which may have changed in
the interim. In some cases, furthermore, no hearing will have been held before parole,
especially where parole is granted pending determination of the alien's admissibility, as
in United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
137. Mezei had lived here for 25 years; Mrs. Knauff had an American husband.
Neither of these factors were considered by the Supreme Court. But see Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952) ; Charmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948);
United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
138. GoRDoN & ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 594. But see H.R. REP. No. 565,
supra note 3, at 11; KINAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY 143-54 (1952). See also cases
cited in Brief for Respondent, p. 34, n.20, Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954).
139. Service of the petition for review upon the local official of the INS stays the
execution of the deportation order, unless the court hearing the petition directs otherwise.
Section I(a) (3), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(a) (3) (Supp. 1961).
See also H.R. RPs. No. 565, supra note 3, at 16.




An order of deportation or exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court
if the alien... has departed from the United States after the issuance of
the order.' 41
CONCLUSION
As a practical necessity, Congress cannot decide all immigration questions by
itself, but must work through an agent.14 This agent, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, is unique among administrative agencies: it is not an
expert body assigned to make determinations of efficient allocation of resources,
but a processor of people, making individual determinations affecting their
liberty.143 As a result, the work of the INS has little to do with rule-making,
141. Section 1(c), H.R. 187, 75 Stat. 653 (1961), 8 U.S.C.A. § ll05a(c) (Supp. 1961).
Once a habeas corpus proceeding is begun, the court's jurisdiction may not be defeated by
removing the alien. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 825. The filing of a
declaratory judgment suit, on the other hand does not automatically stay execution of the
deportation order, although the judge may issue a stay. Id. at 840. Notwithstanding the
broad language of § 1(c), the courts will probably limit it to cases where the departure was
voluntary. A court can probably order the return of an alien who has been removed by
the INS. Since the validity of a return order probably depends on the court's equitable
power to preserve its own jurisdiction, cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906) ;
214 U.S. 386 (1909) ; 215 U.S. 580 (1910) (original contempt citation in Supreme Court
against members of a lynch mob, including sheriff, for mooting habeas corpus brought by
prisoner), a court probably cannot order a return unless the case is already before it. A
district court ordered the INS to return William Heikkila after he was flown to Finland,
but he had no proceeding before the court when the INS removed him. The court later
confessed error. Heikkila v. Barber, 164 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
142. The INS has been well described as sid generis among administrative agencies.
Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 309,
310 (1956). See note 18 supra.
143. On a general level, the task of the INS is simply to judge. The judgment is
basically one of the desirability or "worth" of the applicant. In this sense, the process is
"super-criminal," not punishing an act, but removing people who, on the basis of certain
criteria prescribed in the immigration law, may not be assets to society. The nature of this
choice is reflected in the statutory classifications, many of which are both vague and highly
subjective. The excludability and deportability provisions include such classifications as:
those likely to become public charges, 66 Stat. 183 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15)
(1958) ; 66 Stat. 206 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (8) (1958) ; and those guilty of crimes of
moral turpitude, 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (1958) ; 66 Stat. 204 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) (1958). See generally the provisions of 66 Stat. 182-89 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1958) ; 66 Stat. 204-08 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958). Many of the
classifications are specifically committed to agency discretion. For a description of the opera-
tions of the INS under similar provisions a number of years ago, see VAN VLECx, THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS 36-39, 53-60, 113-34 (1932).
On a less general level, immigration decisions can be used to punish individuals against
whom the ordinary criminal process is ineffective. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
deportation. There, a process which began an an adjunct to exclusion, designed to correct
errors in the admission process, has assumed the unauthorized task of supplementing the
criminal law. See VAN VLEcK, supra at 21-22; letter of Wm. P. Rogers, quoted in Hearings
on H.R. 13311, supra note 3, at 39-40, discussing attempts to reduce crime by deporting
certain gangsters. 1957-1958 INS ANN. REP. 15-16. The efficacy of deportation derives in
large part from continued holdings that it is a civil rather than criminal proceeding, and
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and even in adjudication it differs from the typical agency, bearing a far
greater resemblance to the tasks normally performed by courts.
Hence, essentially judicial functions have become transformed into adminis-
trative tasks performed by the political branch of the government-Congress
and its agency.144 Indeed, in such a system, excessive judicial intervention may,
by applying judicial standards, cancel those benefits of flexible and unified
implementation of immigration policy sought to be gained by operating ad-
ministratively rather than through courts. 145 Whatever the advantages of effi-
therefore does not entitle the subject to the constitutional safeguards accorded a criminal
defendant. Consequently, the comparative ease with which a deportation order can be ob-
tained by the government, together with the advantages of permanent removal rather than
temporary incarceration as a remedy, makes it tempting to use deportation as a substitute
for the criminal process. There is no statute of limitations preventing a deportation order
from being issued at any time after the creation of the cause of deportation. Matter of C.,
5 1 & N Dec. 630, 632 (1954). Further, many of the causes of deportation can be established
at any time before or after ehtry. See, e.g., 66 Stat. 182-83 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (1),
(13), (17) (1958) (condition arising before entry) ; 66 Stat. 182-83 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§
1251(a) (6), (11), (12), (14), (16), (17) (1958) (condition arising at any time after
entry). An alien can even be deported for a condition which, when it was created, was not
cause for deportation. 66 Stat. 187-88 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1958). And once issued,
a deportation order may be executed at any time. See 1958-1959 INS ANN. REP. 9 (order
executed 28 years after issuance).
These provisions have the effect of permitting the deportation of aliens who are essential-
ly products of our society, and whose undesirability has nothing to do with their entry. See
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportees aged 13, 13, and 16 at entry).
In 1959-60, the INS deported 40 aliens who had entered before 1920. 1959-1960 INS
AN . REP., Table 27.
144. The anomaly of the situation is illustrated by the cumbersome mechanism required.
The basic law is set up with restrictive provisions to be applied by the INS. An official of
the INS has described its operation as follows:
'We are now an emigration service, whereas we were formerly an immigration service."
REPORT ON THE INS 10. See also Maslow, supra note 142, at 314-17. In applying these pro-
visions, the Service has relatively little discretion to rule in favor of the alien. Until recent-
ly there was no discretion on the part of the Service; now there are many types of dis-
cretionary relief which the Service may grant, but the eligibility requirements are difficult
to meet, see GoRaox & RosENFIEI.D, op. cit. supra note 20, at 696-706. Even if discretionary
relief is granted by the Service, in many cases Congress must approve each exercise of
discretion. See, e.g., GoanoN & RoSENFIELD, supra, at 790-91. See also Ginnane, Control
of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 569, 582-83, 595-99, 609-11 (1953). Practically, wherever an administrative official has
some doubt about his decision, he is likely to be influenced to rule against the alien, because
of the probable lack of political repercussions from such a decision.
The restrictive nature of the deportation and exclusion provisions which the INS is
delegated to enforce is complemented by the private bill, which in immigration looms so
large, see Note, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 1083 (1956), that it must be reckoned a basic part of
the scheme of regulation by the political branches. Indeed, it may be considered a safety
valve, by which the basic law can be allowed to remain harsh if the pressures applied in
cases of extreme injustice are alleviated by individually-directed congressional action.
145. The Committee feels that a sound uniform national policy on immigration and
deportation cannot be continued if removed from the jurisdiction of a single adminis-
trator, the Attorney General, and submitted to the divergent views of a great many
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ciency provided by the administrative process, however, its development has
been marked by recurrent demands for limitations in the form of procedural
guarantees of fairness. 40 And the content of those demands has fluctuated as
"currently prevailing standards of impartiality" have fluctuated.147
The APA does not represent a single fixed formula of due process, but
rather embodies a quasi-constitutional guarantee of fairness which attempts
to take account of varying needs in different applications of the administrative
process, permitting the adjustment of procedures to fit divergent substantive
requirements. The field of immigration presents especially complex problems
because of the congressional claim of plenary power. As a result, since any
limitation imposed by the APA is in derogation of this power, such limita-
tions become substantive as well as procedural in nature, and procedural and
substantive due process merge in the application of APA requirements to
deportation and exclusion proceedings. The merger of procedural and sub-
stantive due process does not imply that the same standards of review apply
to both types of proceeding, a point explicitly recognized in the Tom We
Shung opinion. Within either of these categories, however, the recognition in
both Pedreiro and Tom We Shung of the inter-relationship between the con-
stitutional requirement of habeas corpus and the review required by the APA
strongly indicates that the two aspects of due process will be jointly expanded
in future immigration cases.
If H.R. 187 receives ungenerous treatment in judicial hands, therefore,
such treatment can be ascribed to the fact that it represents an attempt by
Congress severely to restrict judicial scrutiny of the immigration process 148 in
United States district courts, except as at present on habeas corpus, the fundamental
safeguards [sic] of the rights of the people.
H.R. REP. No. 2140, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948). See Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp.
469 (E.D. Va. 1949). The present bill limiting venue to the circuit courts rather than the
district courts should lead to greater uniformity.
Similar provisions placing venue in circuit courts were present in the 1939 and 1941
detention bills, see note 112 supra, and in a recent series of bills to limit habeas corpus
review in federal courts of state criminal convictions. See, e.g., H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959).
146. In the early 1930s, perhaps prompted by the zeal shown in the enforcement of the
deportation laws, three major studies criticized the immigration process. JANE P. CLARK,
DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE U.S. TO EUROPE (1931); OPPENHEIMER, REPORT TO
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: THE ADMINIs-
TRATION OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931); VAN VLEcK, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932). In 1941, the Secretary of Labor's Committee,
.rpra note 11, severely criticized INS procedures, and in 1952 after the passage of the INA
over his veto, President Truman appointed the President's Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization, whose Report, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME (1953) also criticized the
operation of the immigration laws, though not restricting itself, as had the earlier com-
mittees, to procedural issues. Cf. also the legislative history of the APA, mspra note 36.
147. Compare the standards described in Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745 (8th Cir.
1915), with those described in REPORT ON THE INS 76.
148. The history of immigration regulation exemplifies the general history of the ad-
ministrative process in its rejection, with judicial cooperation, of attempts to impose judi-
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response to cases which have gone far towards establishing such control as
a constitutional necessity.
cial standards, followed, at some distance, by the creation of standards tailored to the
peculiarities of the process. See REPORT ON THE INS 46. Nonetheless, this freedom to
develop unique nonjudicial modes of regulating immigration does not imply a freedom from
judicial participation designed to preserve the necessary safeguards.
In this sense, although the availability of judicial review is a standard, the extent of
that review is a measure of the adequacy of the process under review. Professor Davis
speaks of Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), as "perhaps the high water mark of
review," DAvis, ADmINISTRATmv LAW TREATISE § 237, at 829 (1951). To that case might
be added United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949), involving
judicial review of medical findings. No comparable cases of judicial participation in ad-
ministrative tasks have been noted since, and it seems fair to say that the strictures of fair-
ness imposed on the INS with the aid of the Administrative Procedure Act as an expand-
ing vehicle of due process play an important part in this development. In this way, the two
quasi-constitutional techniques of statutory construction described in notes 108 and 109
supra, as applied to the APA, may not differ. It may be that in the process, the agency
veers closer to judicial standards, but this phase of present "administrative crisis" does
not find the administrators impotent in adapting to growing needs, even if modifications
of the terms of the APA are required. Compare the Symposium on Administrative Regu-
lation in 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 179-346 (1961), with the Symposium on Procedural
Administrative Law, 25 IowA L. REv. 421-620 (1940).
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